



ERÜNAL SOCIAL SCIENCES HIGH SCHOOL
MODEL UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 2025

STUDY GUIDE

NAC

AGENDA ITEM

Iran-Iraq War

UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL

Doruk Esen

ACADEMIC ASSISTANT

Ecem Çoban

ERÜNALMUN2025

1) Letter From The Secretary General

Honourable participants of ERUNALMUN'25; as the secretariat of this glamorous conference, we are highly welcoming you to this journey. And extending appreciation of ours by thanking all of you one by one for choosing The Legacy of Legend.

Our marvelous academic and organization teams worked intensively, spend months to prepair you the best MUN experience that you could ever seen.

Throughout this journey; you will have the chance to debate your ideas by being the part of discussion, improve your negotiation skills, learn new diplomatic terms, enchance your leadership and communication qualifications. And most importantly you will be able to Lead the Light of our future.

We hope you all wonderful committee experience, if you have any issues you are free to contact us

via ozcanramazanrahmi@gmail.com

seloosesn@hotmail.com

Kind regards, Selin Esin & Ramazan Rahmi Özcan
Secretariat of ERUNALMUN'25

2) Letter From The Under-Secretary General,

Esteemed Delegates,

It is my honor to welcome you to this session of UNSC, where you will address one of the most critical and complex crises of our time: the Iran-Iraq War.

In this alternate timeline, the UNSC has been entrusted with the extraordinary power to intervene militarily if it deems such action necessary to preserve global peace and stability. This expanded mandate presents both an opportunity and a challenge.

As delegates, you will need to analyze the Security Council's role in this complex geopolitical landscape. Should UNSC act to safeguard global security, and if so, to what extent?

We expect you to debate on upcoming information however you are expected to write one document at the end of the conference HOWEVER if you believe that you can write more, I encourage you to try and do so if and only if you sincerely believe that you discussed everything you need to discuss.

One last reminder, you do not have to come up with a document at the end of the conference at all. As long as you debated well and did your best it is fine. In other words If you do not write a document, this does NOT mean that the committee has failed.

Sincerely,
Doruk ESEN

3) Letter From The Academic Assistant

I, as the Academic Assistant of the North Atlantic Council Committee,

Welcome you all to this conference. It is an honor and a pleasure to be able to present this committee to all of you. In this study guide my lovely Under Secretary General Doruk Esen and I aimed to explain the committee and the topic as clearly as possible. I highly encourage all of you to read this guide carefully to have a pleasant conference. I wish to have a wonderful conference. Although we tried to explain everything this committee will need lots of further reading according to your allocation.

Lastly I want to thank the Executive Team and Doruk Esen for their invitation and warm welcome. I am thrilled to see you all!

If you have any questions please don't hesitate to ask;

ecemcoban03@gmail.com

Sincerely,

Ecem Çoban

4) Introduction to the Committee

4.1.) What is the North Atlantic Council?

The North Atlantic Council is the principal political decision-making body within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). It oversees the political and military process relating to security issues affecting the whole Alliance. It brings together representatives of each member country to discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective decisions, providing a forum for wide-ranging consultation between members on all issues affecting their peace and security.

The North Atlantic Council (Council or NAC) is the principal political decision-making body within NATO and is the ultimate authority at the head of a network of committees.

Council discussions and decisions cover all aspects of the Organization's activities and are often based on reports and recommendations prepared by subordinate committees, at the Council's request.

The Nuclear Planning Group has comparable authority to the NAC, but only for matters within its specific area of competence, i.e., nuclear policies, planning and consultation procedures.

Policies decided in the NAC are the expression of the collective will of all member countries of the Alliance since decisions are made on the basis of unanimity and common accord.

The Secretary General chairs the NAC and its decisions have the same status and validity at whatever level it meets.

It was the only body established by the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 9) in 1949 and the only one with the authority to set up subsidiary bodies.

4.2.) Powers and Duties of The Council

The NAC has effective political authority and powers of decision. It is the only body that was established by the North Atlantic Treaty, under Article 9:

“The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.”

In addition to being the only body invested with the authority to set up “such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary”, it is also the ultimate authority at the head of a large, intricate network of committees and working groups. It is often referred to as “the Council”.

The NAC is the principal political decision-making body and oversees the political and military process relating to security issues affecting the whole Alliance.

Items discussed and decisions taken at meetings of the Council cover all aspects of the Organization's activities and are frequently based on reports and recommendations prepared by subordinate committees at the Council's request. Equally, subjects may be raised by the Secretary General or any one of the national representatives, in particular under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty:

“The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

Decisions are agreed upon on the basis of unanimity and common accord. There is no voting or decision by majority. This means that policies decided upon by the NAC are supported by and are the expression of the collective will of all the sovereign states that are members of the Alliance and are accepted by all of them. All members have

an equal right to express their views and share in the consensus on which decisions are based.

The NAC meets at least every week and often more frequently, at the level of Permanent Representatives; it usually meets twice a year at the level of ministers of foreign affairs, three times a year at the level of ministers of defence, and occasionally at summit level with the participation of heads of state and government. However, this frequency can differ depending on the need of the Organization to discuss international developments and events.

Permanent Representatives act on instruction from their capitals, informing and explaining the views and the policy decisions of their governments to their colleagues around the table. Conversely, they report back to their national authorities on the views expressed and positions taken by other governments, informing them of new developments and keeping them abreast of movement toward consensus on important issues or areas where national positions diverge.

Each country represented at the Council table or on any of its subordinate committees retains complete sovereignty and responsibility for its own decisions.

5) Prior To The War

5.1) Population and Location


Iran and Iraq lie at the far eastern end of the Middle East. At almost 1.7 million square kilometers, or around 640,000 square miles, Iran is significantly larger than Iraq, which is 440,000 square kilometers, or around 170,000 square miles. Likewise, their populations were also mismatched. In 1980, Iran's population stood at around 38 million, almost triple Iraq's 13 million.

The countries are also different ethnically, linguistically, and culturally. While Iran is predominantly Farsi-speaking Persian, Iraq is mainly Arab. However, in terms of religion, the picture becomes more complex. While Iran is predominantly Shia Muslim, Iraq is split between Sunni and Shia communities, a divide that's long fueled tensions in the country as many Iraqi Shia look to their religious brethren in neighboring Iran for support against the traditionally more dominant Sunni.

5.2) The Historical Relationship

Iran and Iraq's relationship is shaped by a complex, intertwined history stretching back thousands of years. Following the emergence of civilization in Mesopotamia, the land

between the Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers, the two countries have been home to numerous civilizations, including the Babylonian, Assyrian, and Persian Empires



However, the spread of Islam in the 7th century would have a particularly profound impact. Over the following centuries, Baghdad, present-day Iraq's capital, became the political and cultural capital of the predominant Sunni branch of the Muslim faith. Meanwhile, neighboring Persia, as Iran was then known, became a bastion of the Shia branch of the religion. This fault line was cemented in the mid-16th century when the Ottomans conquered Iraq, which became the front line of Turkish and Persian imperial competition. This lasted until the early 20th century.

After the First World War, the Ottoman Empire collapsed, and Iraq came under British control until 1932, when it achieved independence and became the Kingdom of Iraq.

5.3) Iran and Iraq Relations Between 1945-1980

Following the Second World War, Iran and Iraq initially had good relations. As Western-leaning monarchies, they shared a common interest in fending off communism, founding the Baghdad Pact, a Middle East version of NATO, alongside Britain, Pakistan, and Turkey. However, from the start, differences emerged.

In particular, the two countries had a dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Located at the meeting point between the Tigris and Euphrates, it provided strategically crucial access to the Persian Gulf. This would come to a head in 1958 when the Iraqi king was overthrown, and the country became a republic.

From there, tensions grew throughout the 1960s. As Iraq came under the control of the Ba'ath Party with its ideology of Arab nationalism and socialism, it stood in stark contrast to the pro-Western monarchy still ruling in Iran. As Iraq aligned itself more closely with the



Soviet Union, the divide between Baghdad and Tehran widened, leading to occasional border skirmishes. Moreover, a series of uprisings by Iraqi Shia also fed tensions. However, it seemed as though a breakthrough had been reached in 1975 when Algeria managed to broker a border agreement between the sides, dividing control of the strategically vital waterway.

Ultimately, the pivotal moment came in January 1979 when a theocratic revolution overthrew the Iranian monarchy and established an Islamic Republic. While this sent shockwaves throughout the region, the change was particularly strongly felt in Iraq, especially given the new Iranian regime's intention to extend its influence over the Middle East's Shia populations. As a result, the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, saw Iran's new leadership as an existential threat. As diplomatic relations rapidly deteriorated, renewed border clashes erupted. It was at this point that another crucial factor took hold. As the new Iranian regime consolidated its power and rid Iran of the last vestiges of the monarchy, it began purging the armed forces of pro-royal officers. Spotting the country's weakness, Saddam Hussein saw his chance to act, and on the 22nd of September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran.

6) Real War Outline 1980-1987

6.1) 1980-1987 Iraqi offensive and Iranian pushback

In September 1980 the Iraqi army carefully advanced along a broad front into Khūzestān, taking Iran by surprise. Iraq's troops captured the city of Khrromhshahr but failed to take the important oil-refining centre of Abadan. By December 1980 the Iraqi offensive had bogged down about 50–75 miles (80–120 km) inside Iran after meeting unexpectedly strong Iranian resistance. The zeal of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an Iranian state militia initially tasked with safeguarding the Islamic Revolution from internal threats, proved effective: a victory by the militia in April 1981 convinced the Iranian leadership to amplify its role in combat and promote its development. In the months ahead Iraqi forces were compelled to give ground, and in September Iranian forces pushed the Iraqis back across Iran's Karun River

6.2) 1982-1987 Iranian offensive, stalemate, and the Tanker War

In May 1982 Iranian forces recaptured Khorramshahr. Iraq voluntarily withdrew its forces from all captured Iranian territory soon after and began seeking a peace agreement with Iran.

But under the leadership of Ruhollah Khomeini who saw Saddam as an obstacle to the Islamic Revolution, Iran remained adamant and continued the war in an effort to overthrow the Iraqi leader. In July Iranian forces invaded Iraq's Al-Baṣrah province. Iraq's defenses solidified once its troops were defending their own soil, and the war settled down into a stalemate with a static, entrenched front running just inside and along Iraq's border. Iran repeatedly launched fruitless infantry attacks, using human assault waves composed partly of untrained and unarmed conscripts (often young boys snatched from the streets), which were repelled by the superior firepower and air power of the Iraqis. Both nations engaged in sporadic air and missile attacks against each other's cities and military and oil installations.

Despite the conflict being focused in oil-rich regions, the disruption to the global oil flow had been hitherto minimal. But in 1984, with no end to the war in sight, the two countries began attacking each other's oil-tanker shipping in the Persian Gulf. Iran also attacked tankers headed to and from Kuwait and other Gulf states, prompting the United States and several western European nations to station warships in the Persian Gulf to ensure the flow of oil to the rest of the world. The so-called Tanker War, which included strikes on more than 100 oil tankers, marked an increase in international interest and involvement in the conflict.

The oil-exporting capacity of both nations was severely reduced at various times as a result of air strikes and pipeline shutoffs, and the consequent reduction in their income and foreign-currency earnings brought the countries' economic development programs to a near standstill. Iraq's war effort was openly financed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other neighbouring Arab states and was tacitly supported by the United States and the Soviet Union while Iran's only major allies were Syria and Libya.

In 1987 the military balance began to favour Iraq, which had raised an army of about one million and had obtained state-of-the-art arms from France and the Soviet Union, including

thousands of artillery pieces, tanks, and armoured personnel carriers and hundreds of combat aircraft. This arsenal (enormous for a country of some 18 million inhabitants) was bolstered by the addition of substantial quantities of chemical weapons, which the regime acquired or produced throughout the 1980s. At the same time, Iraq committed substantial resources in an attempt to develop or purchase other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including biological and nuclear arms.

In July 1987 the UN Security Council had unanimously passed Resolution 598, urging Iraq and Iran to accept a cease-fire, withdraw their forces to internationally recognized boundaries, and settle their frontier disputes by negotiations held under UN auspices. Iraq agreed to abide by the terms if Iran reciprocated. Iran, however, demanded amendments condemning Iraq as the aggressor in the war (which would have held them liable for paying war reparations) and calling on all foreign navies to leave the gulf.

7) Politics of other nations in the region

The Iran-Iraq War was not just a bilateral conflict; it was deeply intertwined with the geopolitical interests and policies of other nations in the Middle East. Regional powers viewed the war through the lens of their security, ideological alignments, and rivalry for influence. As a result, the war became a focal point for broader political dynamics that shaped the region during the 1980s.

Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, viewed the war with apprehension. Although wary of Saddam Hussein's ambitions, these states supported Iraq to counterbalance Iran's revolutionary rhetoric and its calls to export its Islamic Revolution. Financially, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait provided Iraq with substantial loans, amounting to billions of dollars, in a bid to ensure Iraq could sustain its military campaign and prevent the conflict from spilling over into their territories.

On the other hand, Syria took a starkly different approach. Aligning itself with Iran, Syria aimed to undermine Iraq, its longtime Ba'athist rival. This support was motivated by ideological and political disputes between the Ba'athist governments in Baghdad and Damascus, as well as Syria's broader opposition to Saddam Hussein's regime. Syrian support for Iran included allowing the transit of supplies and cutting off Iraqi access to key oil pipelines, which weakened Iraq's economy.

Turkey adopted a cautious stance throughout the conflict. While officially neutral, Turkey maintained strong economic ties with Iraq, benefiting from the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. However, Turkey also sought to prevent instability along its southeastern borders, particularly as both Iran and Iraq dealt with Kurdish insurgencies. The war presented Turkey with a delicate balancing act as it worked to safeguard its own interests without directly antagonizing either side.

Israel, although geographically removed, followed the conflict with great interest, viewing both Iraq and Iran as potential threats. During the early years of the war, Israel covertly supported Iran, fearing the growing power of Saddam Hussein's military. Israel's provision of arms to Iran, famously revealed in the Iran-Contra affair, underscored the complex web of alliances that emerged during the conflict. This maneuvering was emblematic of Israel's broader strategy to weaken both sides and maintain its relative security advantage.

Finally, following its expulsion from the Arab League in 1979 due to its peace treaty with Israel, Egypt sought to rebuild ties with other Arab states by supporting Iraq. President Anwar Sadat and later Hosni Mubarak provided diplomatic backing and logistical support to Iraq as a way of reasserting Egypt's relevance in regional politics.

8) NATO's Role and Dynamics in the Iran-Iraq War

The Iran-Iraq War occurred during the height of the Cold War, a period in which NATO countries maintained a significant presence and influence in the Middle East. While the alliance was primarily focused on countering Soviet expansionism, the war introduced additional complexities to NATO's strategic considerations in the region. NATO countries, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, viewed the conflict as an opportunity to protect their oil interests and curb any Soviet attempts to capitalize on the instability.

The United States, though not directly involved in combat, played a prominent role in supporting Iraq, particularly in the latter stages of the war. The U.S. provided intelligence, economic aid, and diplomatic backing to Saddam Hussein's regime. This support was part of a broader strategy to prevent Iran's revolutionary ideology from spreading across the region. The infamous "Tanker War," in which Iranian and Iraqi forces targeted shipping in the Persian Gulf, prompted the U.S. to launch Operation Earnest Will, escorting Kuwaiti oil tankers under U.S. flags to safeguard the free flow of oil.

Other NATO countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, offered indirect support to Iraq through arms sales and economic aid. France, notably, became one of Iraq's largest suppliers of military equipment, providing advanced weaponry, including Mirage fighter jets and Exocet missiles. Despite officially advocating for neutrality, many NATO countries saw Iraq as a bulwark against Iran's revolutionary ambitions, which threatened the balance of power in the Gulf and their energy interests.

The Iran-Iraq War coincided with significant shifts in NATO's internal dynamics, particularly regarding France and Greece. In 1966, France, under President Charles de Gaulle, withdrew from NATO's integrated military command, citing a desire for greater strategic autonomy and opposition to perceived American dominance within the alliance. This withdrawal reflected France's broader pursuit of an independent foreign policy, which also influenced its actions in the Middle East. During the Iran-Iraq War, France capitalized on its independence to forge closer ties with Iraq, supplying arms and providing diplomatic support, free from NATO

constraints. This allowed France to strengthen its geopolitical and economic influence in the Gulf.

Greece's withdrawal from NATO's military structure in 1974, following the Turkish operations in Cyprus, marked another fracture within the alliance. Although Greece formally remained a NATO member, its disengagement from military operations created challenges for alliance cohesion, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean. During the Iran-Iraq War, Greece's position within NATO remained ambiguous, as it sought to maintain a neutral stance in the conflict. However, its strategic location and historical ties to the region meant that its withdrawal complicated NATO's ability to project power and monitor developments in the Middle East effectively.

The cases of France and Greece underscore how NATO dynamics influenced the alliance's approach to the Iran-Iraq War and the broader Middle Eastern geopolitics of the era. Their withdrawals reflected broader tensions within NATO over national sovereignty and alliance priorities, highlighting the challenges of maintaining a unified front in a complex and rapidly evolving region.

Beyond economic concerns, the war posed a geopolitical challenge in the context of the Cold War. The conflict presented an opportunity for the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the Middle East by aligning with one or both warring states. A strengthened Soviet presence in the Gulf could undermine NATO's strategic interests and tilt the regional balance of power. This heightened the need for NATO to carefully monitor developments in the region and consider intervention options that would curb Soviet ambitions while maintaining stability.

Intervention also carries significant risks. Direct military involvement may escalate the conflict, leading to retaliation against NATO member states or creating a broader regional war. It could also alienate key partners in the Middle East, such as Turkey, who had their own nuanced positions in the war. NATO had to consider the ethical implications of intervening in a war characterized by widespread civilian casualties, the use of chemical weapons, and the targeting of civilian infrastructure. Such actions required careful deliberation to ensure that NATO's intervention would be justified and aligned with its broader mandate of maintaining peace and stability.

NATO's military assets included an array of highly advanced naval and air forces, which could be critical in securing key shipping routes in the Persian Gulf. Naval power, particularly carrier strike groups and destroyers, could be mobilized to escort oil tankers and deter attacks on maritime trade. Air support from NATO bases in Turkey and the Mediterranean would provide strategic bombing capabilities and surveillance over conflict zones. However, these deployments would require careful planning to avoid overextending NATO's resources or compromising its primary mission of defending Europe.

Logistical challenges would also play a major role in any potential intervention. Supplying troops, equipment, and fuel across long distances would strain NATO's supply chains, particularly given the limited infrastructure in the region. Additionally, the alliance would

need to establish operational bases and secure overflight rights from neighboring states, some of whom might resist NATO's involvement due to political or ideological reasons.

Another key consideration is the risk of retaliation from either Iran or Iraq. Both nations had demonstrated their willingness to escalate the conflict through tactics such as attacking civilian shipping and employing chemical weapons. NATO forces in the region could become targets, leading to potential casualties and public backlash in member states. Moreover, the presence of NATO forces could provoke broader regional or global conflict, particularly if the Soviet Union perceives intervention as a direct challenge to its interests in the Middle East.

NATO's unity and decision-making processes would be critical to the success of any operation. Member states with varying priorities and interests may disagree on the scale or scope of military action, complicating efforts to deploy resources effectively. France, for example, may pursue an independent strategy based on its existing ties to Iraq, while Greece and Turkey's historical tensions could further strain NATO's operational cohesion.

NATO's mandate has been centered on collective defense and maintaining the security of its member states, as outlined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Direct military action in the Middle East, a region outside NATO's traditional focus, could challenge the legal foundations of the alliance's mission.

The issue of sovereignty is a central concern. Both Iran and Iraq are sovereign nations, and NATO intervention could be viewed as a violation of international law unless explicitly sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council. Such an action would need to be justified under extraordinary circumstances, such as protecting critical global resources or responding to violations of international norms, such as the use of chemical weapons.

Some important nation's view about the war

China

China's approach to the Iran-Iraq War is rooted in non-interventionist principles and the pursuit of pragmatic interests. During the war, China supplied arms to both sides, maintaining a balanced policy to secure economic and strategic gains while avoiding overt alignment with either Iran or Iraq.

India

India, while not a member of the UNSC at the time, would be a key regional stakeholder. It maintained a policy of neutrality during the Iran-Iraq War but leaned toward Iraq due to strong economic ties, particularly in the energy sector. India also had significant populations of workers in the Gulf, making the stability of the region critical. As a non-permanent

member of the UNSC in this alternate timeline, India would likely push for a resolution that minimizes disruption to global oil supplies and prioritizes peacekeeping efforts.

Brazil

Brazil's role in the UNSC reflects its interest in global peace and economic stability. During the Iran-Iraq War, Brazil maintained a neutral stance but quietly engaged in arms sales to Iraq, driven by its growing defense industry.

Mexico

As a member of the UNSC, Mexico would likely advocate for peaceful conflict resolution, reflecting its historical commitment to non-intervention and respect for sovereignty. The conflict in the Middle East would primarily concern Mexico due to its impact on global oil prices, as Mexico was a significant oil exporter during this period.

Ethiopia

As a country with ties to both the Soviet Union and the Non-Aligned Movement, Ethiopia would likely advocate for a diplomatic resolution to the Iran-Iraq War, consistent with its focus on decolonization, sovereignty, and regional stability. Ethiopia might also raise concerns about the broader implications of the war for developing nations and the dangers of external interference by superpowers.

Spain

Spain, as a non-permanent member of the UNSC during the Iran-Iraq War, would likely take a position aligned with Western European powers, advocating for stability in the Middle East and protection of global energy supplies. However, Spain might also emphasize the importance of a balanced approach that avoids deepening divisions between East and West or escalating tensions with non-aligned nations.

Weapon Systems of important nations

If the UNSC were to take any action decision some general knowledge about the weaponry systems of important countries should be taken into consideration.

China

China's air force in the 1980s was equipped with a large number of aircraft based on older Soviet designs, such as the Chengdu J-7 (MiG-21 derivative) and Shenyang J-6 (MiG-19 derivative). While these planes could perform basic air-to-air combat and ground attack roles, they lacked the advanced avionics and weapons systems of Western aircraft. On the ground, China's military strength lay in its vast number of Type 59 tanks (a copy of the Soviet T-54) and Type 63 armored vehicles, which, although outdated, could be deployed in large numbers. The Chinese navy at the time was primarily focused on coastal defense, with a limited number of destroyers and frigates, offering minimal power projection capabilities. China also possessed short-range ballistic missiles, such as the DF-3A, which could potentially be used for strategic strikes.

The United States

The U.S. air force in the 1980s was unparalleled, boasting advanced aircraft like the F-15 Eagle, F-16 Fighting Falcon, and A-10 Thunderbolt for ground support, along with the strategic B-52 Stratofortress for long-range bombing missions. On the ground, the United States deployed advanced M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, supported by highly mobile logistics and transport systems, making its ground forces capable of rapid deployment and sustained operations. The U.S. Navy was unmatched in its ability to project power, with aircraft carriers like the Nimitz class, Aegis-equipped destroyers, and Los Angeles-class submarines, capable of dominating the Persian Gulf. Additionally, the U.S. had an extensive arsenal of Tomahawk cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles, which provided precision strike capabilities far beyond the reach of most other nations.

The USSR

The Soviet Union's air force was a direct competitor to the United States, featuring high-performance aircraft such as the MiG-23 and MiG-25 interceptors, and the Su-24 for strike missions. Its ground forces included the battle-hardened T-72 and T-80 tanks, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, and a massive fleet of logistics vehicles, making it a formidable ground presence. The Soviet navy maintained a strong fleet of guided-missile cruisers, destroyers, and nuclear submarines, although its global power projection capabilities were less extensive than the U.S. Navy. The USSR also had an array of missile systems, including the SS-21 short-range ballistic missiles and SCUD-B systems, capable of delivering conventional or chemical warheads over a significant range.

Turkey

Turkey's air force in the 1980s was equipped with a mix of U.S.-supplied aircraft, such as the F-4 Phantom II and F-5 Freedom Fighter, which were capable of providing regional air superiority and ground support. Its ground forces were dominated by aging M48 Patton and M60 tanks, along with substantial infantry and artillery units, making it well-suited for defensive operations. Turkey's navy was relatively modest, consisting of frigates and corvettes geared toward protecting its coastline and securing the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey did not possess advanced missile systems at the time, though its proximity to the conflict zone and NATO infrastructure gave it strategic importance.

Greece

Greece's air force during this period relied on U.S.-supplied aircraft, including the F-4 Phantom II and F-104 Starfighter, giving it limited capabilities in regional operations. On the ground, Greece deployed M48 Patton tanks, along with mechanized infantry supported by artillery units, sufficient for defensive operations but not optimized for extended campaigns abroad. Greece's navy focused on protecting its extensive coastline, with destroyers and frigates providing surface combat capabilities. Greece had no significant missile systems at its disposal, relying instead on NATO's broader infrastructure for any potential escalation.

France

France's air force in the 1980s was among the most advanced in Europe, featuring aircraft like the Mirage F1 and the newly introduced Mirage 2000, capable of air superiority and precision strike missions. On the ground, France deployed the AMX-30 tank, a highly mobile vehicle suited for European and Middle Eastern theaters, supported by mechanized infantry and advanced artillery systems. The French navy was highly capable, including the Clemenceau-class aircraft carriers, frigates, and submarines, allowing France to project power into the Mediterranean and beyond. France also possessed advanced missile technology, such as the Exocet anti-ship missile and the Pluton tactical ballistic missile, providing strategic options for targeted strikes.

Spain

Spain's air force was relatively modest in the 1980s, with aircraft like the Mirage F1 and Northrop F-5 providing air-to-air and ground support roles. On the ground, Spain operated AMX-30 tanks and mechanized infantry units, but its forces were geared more toward territorial defense than expeditionary campaigns. Spain's navy included frigates and corvettes primarily designed for Mediterranean operations, with limited capacity for extended power projection. Spain did not possess any significant missile systems at the time, relying on NATO for strategic capabilities.

Egypt

Egypt's air force, largely rebuilt after the Arab-Israeli conflicts, included U.S.-supplied F-16 Fighting Falcons and French Mirage 5 aircraft, providing a mix of air superiority and strike capabilities. Its ground forces were heavily reliant on Soviet-era T-62 and T-55 tanks, alongside M60 tanks acquired from the United States, making Egypt a strong regional land power. The Egyptian navy, while not extensive, operated frigates and corvettes sufficient for patrolling the Red Sea and Mediterranean. Egypt did not possess advanced missile systems but maintained a stock of SCUD-B ballistic missiles acquired from the Soviet Union, capable of delivering strikes over moderate distances.

QTBA

- Should the UNSC intervene in the war or the region
 - if so how to help civilians
 - if so whether to intervene with weapons
 - if so what would be effects to parties
 - if so why
 - if not why